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5 August 1976

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Crisis Management Working Group Meeting, *August 4, 1976*

1. The Working Group met to consider two papers. The first was a draft by George Carver of the first three sections of our proposed report -- that is, a definition of the problem, a conceptual *posing* position of the three stages of crisis, and a description of normalcy. The second paper, drafted by [ ] attempted to define a small "c" crisis and the steps the Intelligence Community would take to fulfill its responsibilities. [ ] was appointed senior editor to fix up a very rough text and to marry the two pieces. George Carver is shooting for a completed report by mid-week next week so the Group can present at least a rough draft to the DCI later in the week (the Plains expedition notwithstanding).

2. George Carver's draft was conceptually sound and engendered little comment. Perhaps the principal point made was that he should buttress his case for the effectiveness of current working arrangements. I registered minor dissatisfaction over his description of the Agency's role in the production of national intelligence, but did not press the point at this time.

3. [ ] paper stimulated a great deal of comment, first as it concerned production of national intelligence situation reports. It was the consensus of the Group that such a report must be the foundation stone for the Director's maintaining control over Intelligence Community production and collection assets during crises short of general war. It was noted, nevertheless, that the current proposal for production of this situation report will run into heavy weather in NFIB and could conceivably crumble. It was generally felt that the appropriate NIO would be the principal substantive officer during a period of crisis. I attempted to discourage any notions that he would disarrange present organizational arrangements, and the Group, indeed, seemed agreed that he would be the DCI's principal substantive advisor and the conduit for feedback from policymakers on such bodies as WASAG and the NSC to substantive analysts.

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4. The second major issue concerned whether there needs to be some central figure who, during crisis situations, would redirect the collection efforts of program managers. Some thought the NIO should play this role; some thought he would not be able to. Vince Heyman made his pitch for the establishment of an NIO for collection management during crises. Vince was defeated, and it was left that the NIO would have to have focal points in each collection program that he could task to close critical gaps in information.

5. Two other issues arose. Cord Meyer first raised the need for a devil's advocate in task force situations to prevent the development of reenforcing consensuses, citing the last Middle East war as a case in point. I pointed out that there would never be enough bodies for such a purpose. George Carver buried the idea, noting that any sensible task force manager would become wary whenever all people on the task force began nodding in unison. Cord also thought some device was necessary for substantive analysts to have a better idea about the credibility of the DDO reports they receive. This was agreed, and the next draft will attempt to devise such a mechanism.

6. One further idea on task forces -- the practical problem arose of how you produce a national situation report when communications are not adequate to allow the members of the Intelligence Community to coordinate situation reports in a timely fashion and when members of the Intelligence Community will not send persons who can vote their stock to work on the task force. George Carver's solution, which to me makes sense, is that the situation reports would be issued with the notification that the recipients could assume, unless otherwise noted, that the national situation report included the latest information available throughout the Intelligence Community and represented a consensus of analytical views. George believes this device will encourage State and DIA to go where the action is.

7. Our whole project appears, in Pat's and my view, to be on very shaky ground. First there is a problem of the national situation report proposal; secondly, George Carver is leaving on the 16th of August. Cord Meyer, who will take over from George, may have quite different notions of how the Group should proceed in the likely event it has not met George's deadline.

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